DAVID BERCUSON, "TAKING AIM AT CANADA'S SHODDY NATIONAL DEFENCE," NATIONAL POST  (JUNE 14, 2003).

Copyright National Post 2003

David Bercuson is director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary.

UNDERSTANDING CANADIAN DEFENCE by Desmond Morton

Penguin

248 pp., $22

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Desmond Morton is one of Canada's most prolific non-fiction authors and military historians. Understanding Canadian Defence, Morton's latest effort, is intended as a primer for those seeking an introduction to the very broad area of Canadian defence policy, Canadian military history and the ongoing relationship between Canadians and their military, stretching back to the War of 1812.

It was a tall order for Morton to try to cover such immense ground, delving into military history, civil-military relationships, defence economics, grand strategy (not of Canada, which he points out doesn't really exist) and recent advances in military technology.

With his usual sense of irony, Morton does a fine job of pointing out the many ambiguities that lie at the core of Canada's defence dilemmas. But he comes up short on the prescriptive side, which is a shame because, as his many students and fans would no doubt point out, he has important lessons to teach.

Early in the book, Morton poses the central question of Canadian defence: "Superpowers make enemies and so Americans need military power. Does Canada?"

The ensuing 216 pages constitute his answer. Morton implies that the answer is "yes," but this must be gleaned through several long chapters summarizing Canadian military history, from the War of 1812 through the war against terrorism and the short-lived, but costly, Canadian contribution to the ouster of the Taliban and al-Qaeda from Afghanistan. And it is never entirely clear what Morton's argument is: Canada needs military power because we have always had it? Because sovereign nations are responsible for their own national security? Because Canadians have never aspired to be bystanders? Yes, but also no. The book is a testament not only to Morton's prodigious knowledge of Canadian military history, but to his oft- aired philosophy that Canadian history is an unending working out of the yins and the yangs, of imperatives for action always balanced by reasons not to act.

Nowhere is this so obvious as in his chapter on the current state of the Canadian Forces, "No Life Like It." Take the following judgment on the current emphasis on teaching ethics to Canadian soldiers: "Preaching ethics is one way of undermining the military's powerful group culture. Your ethical judgment is individual; presumably you are encouraged to value it more highly than the orders from a superior officer or even the interests of your group. Too bad if your side loses or your chums die. Or perhaps, like so much peacetime training, it is all make believe."

Huh? Is Dr. Morton telling us that teaching ethics and the laws of war to Canadian soldiers is useless? Hypocritical? Dangerous to military discipline and thus to victory in military operations? The paragraph is an evasion of Morton's responsibility to tell the readers exactly where he stands on this issue. He raises the question, but he shies from an answer.

So it goes throughout the book. Should we try to keep up with the Americans in even small and limited ways? Morton implies that it is our responsibility to share burdens with them, that we can't expect a free ride. But the claim is also "the best argument National Defence ever found to loosen up a share of taxpayers' dollars and that case has worked overtime since September 11, 2001." More cynicism.

It would be unfair to fail Morton as an inadequate forecaster. As he himself admits, he has a deep suspicion of forecasting, and he is most surely right. In all the hoopla over "Shock and Awe" and the likely impact of digital-data uplinks on future wars, historians know that simple thirst is still the most urgent need to be met in desert warfare. Good military historians know (and Morton is one of the best) that not much really changes in the butchers' business that war is, except the accoutrements.

Still, Canadians have much to learn about the long and mostly sad history of Canadian defence unreadiness. This past 10 years of broken promises, failed commitments, reaction instead of action, and passivity in virtually every area of Canadian defence policy is only the latest decade of defence indecision, and it shows no sign of ending.

Canadians thus need the wisdom that scholars such as Morton have amassed in deciding whether or not to remain international wallflowers, or to play a worthy and honourable role in the defence of their nation.

In the end, the answer to Morton's question about whether or not Canada needs military power is the one that Winston Churchill gave long ago. Our choice is to have our own army, or someone else's.