The Arab-Israeli Conflict

HEBR7750 (BA)
HEBRG009 (MA)

University College London

Dr. Neill Lochery

Academic Year 2009-2010

Term One and Two

Tuesday 5.00-7.00
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
Syllabus Outline

The subject introduction adopts a chronological approach to the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict from its origins at the start of the 20th century through to the peace process of recent decades. It aims to provide an in-depth historical analysis of the complex development of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and assess its interaction with Arab and Israeli domestic politics. In specific terms, it introduces students to the main secondary literature and primary documentation on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The syllabus is divided into the following sections:

1. The development of the Zionist movement in Palestine and the Arab responses, 1918-1948
2. The 1948 War: the birth of Israel
3. The development of the Arab states
4. The Suez Crisis: internal and external turning point
5. The rise of Pan-Arabism and Nasser
6. The Six Day War: the new Israel
7. From War to War, 1967-1973
8. The October 1973 War
9. The rise of the Likud in Israel
10. Israeli-Egyptian peace
11. Israel’s Lebanon War, 1982-2000
13. From the Persian Gulf War to Madrid
14. The Oslo Peace Accords, 1993: the start of the end?
15. Israel-Jordan: from secret to public peace
17. From Hebron to Wye: peacemaking under Netanyahu
18. Israel’s changing role in the Middle East
19. Conclusions

Each section contains a summary of background information on the topic, specific areas to focus on, and a bibliography. Sources are categorised as either ‘recommended reading’ or ‘background reading’. Students are advised to have looked at one of the recommended reading texts prior to each of the lectures.

Method of Assessment

BA Students
The subject is assessed by one three hour written examination in May/June 2009 (70% of final mark). You will be asked to answer three essay questions from a choice of ten. The questions will reflect the topics covered in the syllabus, but not all of them will necessarily feature in any particular exam paper. You should therefore make sure that you have covered enough of the syllabus to enable you to answer fully
the required number of questions. Two coursework essays of 2,500 words from the enclosed list (30% of final mark)

MA Students
Students take a three hour dedicated MA written examination in May/June 2009. You will be asked to answer three questions from a total of ten (80% of final mark). The questions will reflect the topics covered in the syllabus, but not all of them will necessarily feature in any particular exam paper. You should therefore make sure that you have covered enough of the syllabus to enable you to answer fully the required number of questions. One coursework essay of 5,000 words from the enclosed list (20% of final mark)
BA Coursework Essays 2009-2010

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Choose Two of the following questions.

Answer in 2,500 words each.

First Essay due on Wednesday 16th December 2009.
Second Essay due on Wednesday 24th March 2010.

Remember to read the Hebrew and Jewish Studies Departmental Style Sheet for writing essays.

1. To what extent was the War of Attrition (1967-1970) a direct result of Israel’s victory in the June 1967 War.

2. Assess the motives and the impact of the decision by the Israeli government not to respond to attacks by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

3. Examine the changing role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East between 1956 and 1991.

4. Discuss the extent to which the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 were caused by internal Arab and Israeli political dynamics.

5. Choose TWO of the following peace agreements and discuss their significance to the Arab-Israeli conflict:
   A. The Camp David Accords (1978)
   B. Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty (1994)

6. Assess the various roles of the United States in the peace process from the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 to the present day.

7. Evaluate the role of the Lebanon War (1982-2000) in changing the strategic map of the Middle East.


9. Evaluate the extent to which President Nasser of Egypt managed to orchestrate a unified Arab position towards Israel on the eve of the June 1967 War.
10. Examine the key differences between Israel’s ‘new historians’ and ‘old historians’ over the 1948 War.

11. Evaluate the extent to which the Suez War of 1956 genuinely marked a turning point in the Middle East.
MA Coursework Essays 2009-2010

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Choose One of the following questions.

Answer in 5,000 words.

Essay due on Wednesday 24th March 2010.

Remember to read the Hebrew and Jewish Studies Departmental Style Sheet for writing essays.

1. To what extent was the War of Attrition (1967-1970) a direct result of Israel’s victory in the June 1967 War.

2. Assess the motives and the impact of the decision by the Israeli government not to respond to attacks by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

3. Examine the changing role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East between 1956 and 1991.

4. Discuss the extent to which the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 were caused by internal Arab and Israeli political dynamics.

5. Choose TWO of the following peace agreements and discuss their significance to the Arab-Israeli conflict:
   i. The Camp David Accords (1978)
   iii. The Hebron Agreement (1997)

6. Assess the various roles of the United States in the peace process from the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 to the present day.

7. Evaluate the role of the Lebanon War (1982-2000) in changing the strategic map of the Middle East.


9. Evaluate the extent to which President Nasser of Egypt managed to orchestrate a unified Arab position towards Israel on the eve of the June 1967 War.
12. Examine the key differences between Israel’s ‘new historians’ and ‘old historians’ over the 1948 War.

13. Evaluate the extent to which the Suez War of 1956 genuinely marked a turning point in the Middle East.
Junior Year Abroad One-Term Students

Coursework Essays 2009-2010

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Choose One of the following questions.

Answer in 5,000 words each.

1st term only JYA’s Essay due on Wednesday 16th December 2009.

2nd term only JYA’s Essay due on Wednesday 24th March 2010.

Remember to read the Hebrew and Jewish Studies Departmental Style Sheet for writing essays.

1. To what extent was the War of Attrition (1967-1970) a direct result of Israel’s victory in the June 1967 War.

2. Assess the motives and the impact of the decision by the Israeli government not to respond to attacks by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

3. Examine the changing role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East between 1956 and 1991.

4. Discuss the extent to which the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 were caused by internal Arab and Israeli political dynamics.

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10. Examine the key differences between Israel’s ‘new historians’ and ‘old historians’ over the 1948 War.

11. Evaluate the extent to which the Suez War of 1956 genuinely marked a turning point in the Middle East.

**Junior Year Abroad Full Year Students**

JYA students who are here for the entire year follow the BA path outlined earlier in this section.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
General Reading List

These texts are designed to provide you with a general introduction to the core issues and events that you will cover in greater detail during your course of study.

Read at least **ONE** from each of the following sections to help you prepare for the course.

The specific reading lists for each lecture that also enclosed below are designed to help with the preparation of essays. Help will also be provided in using the UCL database of on-line journals, which is another important source of information.

**The Arab-Israeli conflict:**


**General histories of the Middle East:**


**Political and economic studies of the Middle East:**


General histories of Israel:


General histories of the Palestinians:

Section 1

The development of the Zionist movement in Palestine and the Arab responses, 1918-1948

Background
The development of the Zionist institutions in Palestine was vital on Israel’s road towards statehood. In essence, the Zionist leadership in Palestine set about developing the framework for a national home for the Jews using the ‘state within a state’ formula. The Zionist labour movement, in effect, aimed to develop a state in waiting, one on which the local Jewish population, and newly arriving immigrants, were heavily dependent for their everyday needs. Central to this aim was the setting up of strong political parties, trade unions, immigrant absorption machines, armed forces and economy (both the agricultural and industrial sectors).

The success of these institutions was borne out by the ease with which they were transformed into a fully sovereign state in 1948. Perhaps the two most significant developments during the period of the British Mandate were the setting up of the Histadrut (the General Federation of Hebrew Labour) in 1920 and the formation of the political party Mapai in 1930. The latter proved to be, in one form or another, the dominant political force in both the Yishuv (Jewish settlement and communal organisations in the pre-state period in Palestine) and in the state of Israel until 1977. It was from this party that the early national leaders of Israel emerged, where figures such as David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett all had their roots.

Throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s, during the era of the British Mandate, Palestine was run along the lines of a British colony. British High Commissioners had to deal with increasing anger from Arab residents over the continuing Jewish immigration. During this period, hostilities between the local Arab population and the Jews increased with the resulting outbreaks of violence and general civil unrest. The British position reflected these difficulties and as a result the British established a framework policy for limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine

Key Questions
1. What role did external actors play in shaping the development of the Zionist movement in Palestine between 1918 and 1948?
2. The Jewish immigrants: who came and why?
3. How successful were the Zionist institutions that were developed in the Yishuv, and why?
4. Assess the divisions within the Zionist camp.
5. Was there a possibly of peaceful coexistence in Palestine between Jews and Arabs during the pre-state period?

Recommended reading

Background reading
• Karsh Efraim (edited), Israel the First Hundred Years: Volume One Israel’s Transition from Community to State, Frank Cass, London and Portland, 2000. [ISBN 0-7146-8023-0].
Section 2

The 1948 War: the birth of Israel

Background
The first of the Arab-Israeli wars remains one of the costliest in terms of lives lost by both sides. Fought in two major stages, the first stage was characterised by Arab gains and Israeli losses. The second stage followed a period of ceasefire in which Israel had rearmed its army and was characterised by Israeli gains and Arab retreats. Eventually Israel signed formal Armistice agreements with the Arab states in 1949. The Palestinians were not represented at these talks and the lands that had been proposed for a Palestinian state by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947 were divided between Israel and the Arab states.

Key Questions
1. How and why was the Palestinian refugee problem created?
2. Could a peace process between Israel and the Arabs have begun in the period between 1948 and 1956?
3. Consider the role played by external parties (USA, GB and the United Nations) in the 1948 War.
4. How important was the arms race, and the so-called arms embargo in the Middle East, for the cause and outcome of the 1948 War?

Currently, there are major debates among historians over all the above issues, and these are reflected in the reading lists. This has been caused, in part, by the release in Israel and Great Britain of selective documents that cover the war, and by the highly emotive nature of the issues. Many of them dating from 1948 remain relevant to the present day negotiators.

Recommended reading

Background reading
Section 3

The development of the Arab states

Background

Central to the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the development of the Arab states. In the early years of the conflict the states were undergoing profound political, social and economic changes. In political terms many were going through a period of decolonisation with monarchies replacing the colonial power. These states were highly unstable and volatile. As a result of the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1948 war many of these monarchies did not survive and were replaced in coups by military leaders. The link between the domestic Arab politics and the Arab-Israeli conflicts is very strong. At times, the conflict was used by Arab leaders to deflect from domestic political or economic difficulties. It also helped provide a degree of legitimacy for the Arab leaders. As a result, it is important to examine developments in the major Arabs states from the time of their respective independence.

Key Questions

1. How does the political development of the State of Israel compare with that of the Arab state (Egypt, Jordan and Syria)?
2. What were the main trends in the economic development of the Arab states (Egypt, Jordan and Syria) up to 1956?
3. Evaluate the role of the ex-colonial powers (France and GB) in the politics and economy of Arab states up to 1956.

Recommended reading


Background reading

Section 4

The Suez Crisis: internal and external turning point

Background

In the period following the signing of the armistice agreements in 1949 it became clear that these agreements would not serve as the precursor to ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab states steadfastly refused to accept Israel’s right to exist and saw the defeat in the 1948 War as temporary, something that needed to be rectified at a later date. Consequently, Israel in the period between 1949 and the start of the Suez crisis remained both politically and economically isolated in the region. Economic sanctions against Israeli commercial and maritime interests were imposed by Arab governments and cross border raids by fedayeen terrorist groups led to mounting casualties in Israel - many of which were civilian. Israel responded with retaliatory raids deep into Arab territory and consequently there was a near constant cycle of violence between 1948 and 1956.

The issues at the core of the second Arab-Israeli war were much more complex than those involved in Israel’s War of Independence. There were a number of reasons for this: the direct participation of the United Kingdom and France in the planning and fighting stages of the conflict, the indirect participation of the United States and the Soviet Union, the complex strategic objectives of the participants and the shifting backdrop to the war. For the UK and France the Suez Crisis marked one of the last stands of the European colonial powers in the Middle East. Though it was clear, following the end of World War Two, that their influence was already declining, many policy makers in both countries appeared unaware of the extent of this decline. The outcome of the Suez crisis removed all such illusions. By the end of the war, the United States and the Soviet Union were the two major external actors in the region and this was to remain the case until the demise of the Soviet Union in the late 1980’s. From an Arab-Israeli perspective, the origins of the Suez War lay in the outcome of the 1948 war. Israel had been unable to translate its military success into a political victory - Arab recognition of Israel’s right to exist.

Key Questions

1. To what extent did the Suez War of 1956 genuinely mark a turning point in the internal politics of Israel and Egypt?
2. What role did external actors play in the conflict (France, GB and USA)?
3. How did the new strategic realities in the Middle East following the end of the Suez Crisis reflect the Cold War?

Recommended reading

Background reading


Section 5
The Rise of Pan Arabism and Nasser

Background
Between 1956 and 1967, while the Israeli-Egyptian border remained relatively quiet - mainly as a result of the stationing of the UN force to act as a buffer between the two sides - the Middle East continued to be extremely volatile. President Nasser was the central figure in the Arab world, and he continued to attempt to export his brand of Pan-Arabism to other Arab states. Nasser had survived the Suez War with his authority intact. His position within the Arab world had actually been enhanced since he was perceived as having stood up to Western imperial aggression. The military losses to Israel were compensated for by the rapid reassertion of his control over the areas that the Israeli forces had been forced to vacate. Nasser was a leader at the height of his powers and moved to become the dominant political force among the Arabs.

Issues

- The continued instability of Arab regimes during this period.
- The merger of, Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic in February 1958, on the Middle East.
- The attempts by President Nasser to undermine the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan led by King Hussein.

Key Questions
1. Why did so many Arab regimes fail to survive?
2. How important was the merger of Egypt and Syria for the Middle East?
3. What methods did President Nasser of Egypt employ to export Pan-Arabism to the wider Arab world?

Recommended reading


Background reading

Section 6

The Six-Day War: the new Israel

Background

The Six-Day War changed the strategic position of Israel in the Middle East beyond recognition. At its conclusion Israel controlled lands that could be used as a buffer zone, in the south the Sinai, in the west the West Bank and in the north the Golan Heights. An important feature of the new political map was the large numbers of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that came under Israeli military rule. President Nasser suffered a humiliating defeat. Nasser had offered to resign in the middle of the war, but popular support persuaded him to stay on. In Jordan, King Hussein had paid a heavy price for entering the conflict and would not make the same mistake in the 1973 war. Syria had lost its ability to shell Israeli settlements from the Golan Heights, but its leadership vowed to return the Golan to Syrian control. Significantly, for the first time, Israel had bargaining chips to trade at potential Arab-Israeli negotiations that were expected to follow the ending of the war. The reality, however, was different as it soon became clear that once more Israel would not be able to translate its military victory into a political one.

Key Questions

1. What were the main causes of the war? Pay special attention to the internal dynamics in Israel and the Arab world.
2. Examine the changes to Israel’s borders, and assess the resulting new strategic balance of the Middle East, at the conclusion of the war.
3. What were the divisions in the ruling Israeli Labour Party over what to do with the conquered lands between 1967 and 1973?
4. How did each of the Arab states respond to the war, and why?

Recommended reading


Background reading

Section 7
From War to War, 1967-1973

Background
At the end of the Six-Day War there was a feeling in Israel that the defeat of Egypt, Jordan and Syria meant an end to the Arab-Israeli wars and that peace negotiations would follow in the imminent future. Israel had become the dominant power in the region and the fact that it controlled new lands, well beyond its borders, meant that it would enter the negotiations from a position of strength. Any hopes, however, that the Six-Day War would lead to peace were soon dispelled with the onset of what became known as the War of Attrition, fought between mid-1967 and the ceasefire in August 1970.

Political confirmation of the Arab hard-line position towards Israel appeared to come at the Khartoum Summit Conference on 1st September 1967. It laid down the three no’s resolution: no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel and no peace with Israel. President Nasser went further inserting an additional ‘no’ to the Khartoum resolution: no concessions on the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Nasser moved quickly to attempt to rebuilt morale among the Egyptian armed forces, and developed a new military strategy based on three phases: the defensive rehabilitation phase, the offensive phase and the liberation phase. Nasser, in short, was in no mood for what would be seen as surrender, and though he would only live long enough to see the implementation of the first two phases of his plan, he pursued its aims with increasing vigour. After Nasser’s death in 1970, he was succeeded by Anwar el-Sadat who developed a plan for a limited war with Israel.

Key Questions
1. Consider the attempts of the US to broker peace deals between Israel and the Arab states through the Rogers 1 and Rogers 2 peace plans. Why did both plans fail?
2. What role did the Superpowers play in the War of Attrition? Consider the political, military and economic dimensions of the issue.
3. What were the main internal dynamics in Israel and in the Arab world between 1967 and 1973?

Recommended reading
Background reading
Section 8

The October 1973 War

Background

The Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) War or as it is known by its other names, the October War, Ramadan War, or simply the 1973 War caused a trauma in Israel that has lasted to this day. In the short-term, it led to the shattering of the myth of Israeli invincibility that had developed since the 1967 War - and the security credentials of the political ruling elite from the Labour Alignment. The origins of the war itself, to a large degree, lie in the outcome of the Six Day War - and specifically the political and military lessons that the Arab leadership learnt from this defeat. President Sadat planned to recover the lands lost in 1967 to Israel by a mixture of political and military moves. Sadat concluded, correctly, that any military action taken by Egypt would be met by a massive retaliation by Israel. Consequently, the Egyptian leader understood that there was little alternative but to launch as big an attack as possible

Key Questions

1. What is the concept of limited war aims? How did it impact on the Arab prosecution of the war?
2. What role did the superpowers (USA and the Soviet Union) play in the war and its immediate aftermath?
3. What was the impact of the war on Israeli society?

Recommended reading

Section 9

The Rise of the Likud in Israel

Background

One of the major consequences of the initial failings of the Israeli elite in the 1973 Yom Kippur War was its effect in hastening the decline of the ruling Labour Party, and following the 1977 elections the centre-right Likud led by Menachem Begin was able to form a coalition government for the first time. Prior to coming to power it was widely assumed that the Likud would adopt a hard-line approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. What materialised during the first Begin-led administration was much more complex.

After taking power, the Begin government attempted to develop a peace process on the Palestinian front with its Plan for Palestinian Autonomy, 28th December 1977. Though the plan did not grant any degree of sovereignty to the Palestinians, the level of autonomy that Begin was willing to grant them surprised many from the right in Israel. The debate in Israel over Begin’s plans was somewhat superseded by the rejection of the plan by the vast majority of Palestinians, and Israel’s lack of a partner for negotiations among the Palestinians.

Key Questions
1. What were the major reasons for the decline of the Israeli Labour Party, and the coming to power of the Likud in 1977?
2. Consider both changes and continuity in Israeli foreign policy during the era of the first Begin-led government.

Recommended reading

Background reading
Section 10

Israeli-Egyptian peace

Background

In Egypt President el-Sadat was experiencing increasing domestic difficulties, both economic and political. The liberalisation of the Egyptian economy and the removal of subsidies on essential goods triggered the ‘bread riots’ in January 1977, the most serious civil disturbances seen in Egypt for 25 years. The riots only stopped when Sadat personally cancelled the price increases. After the Soviet Union had refused to reschedule Egyptian debt, Sadat looked to the USA, which agreed to help. Sadat, as a result, cancelled the Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Treaty, and from this point on Egypt has remained very much in the US camp. At the same time, Sadat became increasing concerned about the vacuum in the political process with Israel, noting the need for negotiations that would enable Egypt to regain the lands that it had lost in 1967. The return of the Sinai would go a long way to boosting his internal political position. In Israel, Begin faced similar domestic difficulties. The government appeared to be in a state of near permanent crisis, and there was widespread speculation that it would not see out its first term in office.

Key Questions

1. How important was President Sadat’s shift away from the Soviet Union to the United States camp in securing a peace deal with Israel?
2. To what extent did the Palestinian issue influence the negotiations between Israel and Egypt?
3. What role did the Carter administration play in facilitating an agreement between Israel and Egypt?

Recommended reading


Background reading

Section 11
Israel’s Lebanon War, 1982-2000

Background

Israel’s war in Lebanon, named ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’, did not start in earnest until June 1982, but the underlying causes of the war can be traced back to two factors: the use of Lebanon for a base by the PLO, and the Lebanese civil war that brought anarchy to the country. Prior to 1982, Israeli military planners had been preparing a major operation to permanently remove the PLO from southern Lebanon. The political planners, however, had a more complex operation in mind that involved helping to install a pro-Israeli Christian leader in power in Beirut. In simple terms, Israel planned to enter the complex and dangerous world of Lebanese politics in order to try to affect the balance of power in the country. Central to the scheme of those who supported the direct intervention in Lebanese politics was the need for secrecy, and therefore during the initial stages of the operation, the military objectives were to be stressed to both the Israeli public and the wider world. The consequences of these actions had a profound impact on Israeli paramilitary and extra-parliamentary politics.

Key Questions
1. Examine the various stages of the war. What was the Israeli war aim for each stage?
3. What was the effect of Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 on the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Recommended reading

Background reading
Section 12

The Palestinian Intifada, 1987-1992

Background

The popular uprising known by its Arabic name ‘Intifada’ started on 9th December 1987, after four Palestinian workers from the Gaza Strip were run over and killed by an Israeli truck. In the highly charged atmosphere of the time, rumours soon started to spread that it was not an accident, and during the funerals violent demonstrations broke out in the Jebalya refugee camp and other parts of the Gaza Strip. This incident proved to be only the catalyst, and the popular uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that followed took both the Israeli government and the PLO leadership by surprise. The Intifada was to last for nearly six years, and it came to have a profound impact upon the peace process and the eventual decision of the Israeli government to open a dialogue with the PLO.

The Intifada started against a general background of increasing Palestinian frustration in the territories over the failure of the peace process and amidst signs that the PLO was adopting a new and more pragmatic approach to dealing with Israel. Yasser Arafat declared that the PLO accepted the two-state solution to what he termed the Palestine question. In addition, he also appeared to embrace the diplomatic path to achieving the goal of a Palestinian state. Though the US administration of Ronald Reagan had some concerns over Arafat’s phrasing in the statements he made to confirm this new position, they eventually accepted that this marked a positive development in the peace process. The Israeli government, on the other hand, was deeply divided over the peace process. The National Unity Government, now led by Yitzhak Shamir, had reached a state of stalemate on the peace process with both the Cabinet and the Inner Security Cabinet splitting along party lines. The London Agreement of 1987, agreed in private between King Hussein of Jordan and Shimon Peres, became the divisive issue within the government.

Key Questions

1. How did the failure of the London Agreement of 1987, and the subsequent abandonment of Jordanian claims on the West Bank, lead to the start of the Intifada?
2. Consider the changes in PLO policy and the adoption of the two-state solution in 1988.
3. To what extent did the electoral stalemate in Israel, and the paralysis in the government, make peace making difficult at this stage?

Recommended reading


**Background reading**

Section 13

From the Persian Gulf War to Madrid

Background

The Persian Gulf War was very different from Israel’s previous wars. No IDF personnel took part in it; Israel did not fire a shot in anger, but rather relied on the efforts of others to prevent attacks on Israel. Two of the strands of Israeli military doctrine were broken: the use of retaliation and self-reliance on security issues. The Persian Gulf War became Israel’s first television war; with round the clock coverage on the cable networks. As a result, PR and getting the message across became almost as important as the attacks themselves.

In the longer-term, the war had a strong impact of the arguments that both the doves and the security hawks in Israel used to support their positions on the future status of the territories. The doves argued that the maintenance of buffer zones using the West Bank did not stop the missiles from reaching their targets. The security hawks argued that without the West Bank under Israeli control, the Iraqis might have been more tempted to move troops westwards through Jordan and pose a direct threat to Israel’s eastern borders.

In the months that followed the end of the war, the US embarked on intense diplomatic activity aimed at using the military victory as a basis for developing a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The chosen mechanism for achieving this aim remained an international conference and direct talks between Israel and the Arab states. Secretary of State, James Baker, shuttled between Jerusalem and the Arab capitals, employing his considerable Texan charm to persuade the leaders to attend. Baker’s major political asset was the strength of the US, which following the collapse of the Soviet Union, had emerged as the single dominant power in the region. Eventually, the President of Syria agreed to take part in such a conference, and Shamir was given enough reassurances by the US in order to allow Israel to attend.

Key Questions

1. Examine the changes in the Middle East following the end of the Cold War.
2. To what extent did the Persian Gulf War impact upon Israeli-US relations?
3. What were the short-term effects of PLO support for Iraq on the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Recommended reading


Background reading
Section 14

The Oslo Peace Accords, 1993, the start of the end?

Background

The election of the Labour Party under Yitzhak Rabin on 23rd June 1992 was hailed as a victory for the peace block in Israel. The subsequent formation of a dovish looking government that included the newly formed left of centre Meretz and the ultra-orthodox party Shas, appeared to indicate a major change of direction in Israel’s positions towards the peace process. Rabin initially moved with great caution on the peace process. By early 1993, however, it was clear that his government was in trouble with coalition partners threatening to leave the administration. The so-called secret Oslo channel was an ideal way out of the increasing domestic difficulties that the government found itself in. The Oslo negotiations were complex, often in a state of crisis, but with both sides away from their domestic constituencies, they appeared to be more pragmatic. The resulting agreement and its successors formed the basis of the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the 1990’s.

Key Questions

1. What was the perceived weakness of both the Israeli government and the PLO at the time of the negotiations? How did it affect them?
2. Consider the use of creative ambiguity in the Oslo Accords.
3. What were the major successes and failures of the Oslo Accords, 1993-2000?

Recommended reading


Background reading

Section 15

Israel-Jordan: from secret to public peace

Background

The negotiations that led to a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan proved to be much more straightforward, and less divisive, than the deals with the PLO. Once the PLO had signed a deal with Israel, King Hussein felt able to start the process of normalisation with Israel that soon gathered its own momentum. Indeed, the King became increasingly concerned over the possible development of an Israeli-PLO axis that would have severe implications for the Hashemite Kingdom. From a personal point of view, the signing of the Israel-PLO agreement allowed the King to complete what he viewed as the work of his grandfather, King Abdullah, who was murdered in front of him in 1951 for attempting to reach an accord with Israel. The King’s health problems may have played a role in his decision; he had been treated for cancer in the US earlier in 1994. In short, both the strategic and personal dynamics pushed King Hussein to move towards reaching a formal accord with Israel. There remained strong rejectionist forces in Jordan, which opposed any deal with Israel, so King Hussein had to move with great caution. During the initial stages of the negotiations, the secrecy that had characterised Jordan’s relations with Israel for nearly fifty years was maintained.

Key Questions

1. How important was the issue of water rights in the negotiations?
2. Could the return of land by Israel to Jordan, and the subsequent leasing of this land back to Israel by Jordan, serve as a model to help solve other territorial disputes in the Middle East?
3. What have been the effects of the peace deal on the Middle East in the period from 1994 to 2000?

Recommended reading


Background reading

Section 16

The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and its effect on the Peace Process

Background

Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated on November 4th 1995, following a rally against political violence held in Tel Aviv. In assessing the short-term political impact of Rabin’s death, there are two clear consequences. It severely reduced the level of support for the opposition leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, personally, and for the parties of the right in general. The centre-ground voters, outraged by the assassination, clearly shifted back to the Labour Party. As it turned out, the shift in Israeli public opinion proved to be temporary, and a series of suicide bomb attacks by Islamic militants, in late February-early March 1996, redrew the political map of Israel once more. The attacks on buses shifted Israeli public opinion back towards the right. In essence, the question of Israeli personal security became the dominant issue at the heart of the political process. The assassination of Rabin had a profound impact upon the 1996 election campaign style, but little impact on the result. In the end, Netanyahu won a narrow but decisive victory by under 1% in Israel’s first direct election for PM. In the Knesset, both Likud and the Labour Party did badly, largely as result of the election system, but the overall balance between left and right remained relatively unchanged.

Key Questions

1. What were the short-term consequences for the peace process of the death of Rabin in the period between 1995 and 1996?
2. What was the longer-term impact of Rabin’s death on the peace process in the period to 2000?
3. To what extent, and in what ways, did rejectionist Islamic groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad shape the direction and speed of the peace process between 1994-2000?

Recommended reading


Background reading

Section 17
From Hebron to Wye: peace making under Netanyahu

Background

The era of the Netanyahu government, 1996-1999, was one of near permanent crisis in the peace process. The collapse of the peace process, however, that so many forecasted in the immediate aftermath of his election victory in May 1996, did not happen until 1999. This resulted in part from the resilience of the Oslo Accords, but also from the ability of Netanyahu to push his coalition and Cabinet into making concessions when the time called. The PM was faced with the complex and difficult negotiations that were left over from the Rabin-Peres era, and in effect the most problematic issues such as Jerusalem, refugees and the issue of a Palestinian state remained to be dealt within the framework of final status negotiations. In addressing the issues Netanyahu had to deal with contradictory pressures: from the international community to make concessions - and domestically a series of internal pressures from his Cabinet, party and wider coalition, not to make any further concessions. In numerical terms, over two-thirds of his coalition had at best severe reservations about the Oslo process, and many were strongly opposed to the agreements with the PLO. During his entire three-year period of office, the PM started from a position of weakness each time he brought an agreement before the Cabinet.

Key Questions
1. To what extent did coalition politics in Israel prevent progress on the peace process during the era of the Netanyahu government between 1996-1999?
2. What led to the increasing divisions in Palestinian society?
3. What were the major problems of the Hebron agreement (1997) and the Wye Agreement (1998)?

Recommended reading.
Section 18
Israel’s Changing Role in the Middle East

Background
Following the collapse of peace negotiations at Camp David between Israel and the Palestinians, and the political impasse that followed, a new Palestinian Intifada began in October 2000.

The October 2000 Intifada has illustrated the complexity of the Arab world’s relations with Israel. The more pragmatic Arab countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, moved to prevent an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinians conflict for two reasons. First, in order to diminish the threat of the conflict turning into a full-scale regional war, and second, to prevent the unrest spreading into their countries. In the case of Jordan this was particularly important, given the fact that the majority of its population is of Palestinian origin. However, for Egypt this was also a factor since it had experienced in the past mass popular rallies against Israel. It was these domestic pressures that led Egypt to recall its Ambassador from Israel in November 2000.

The reaction of the Arab states to the start of the Intifada demonstrates the increasing complexity of the Middle East politics, and in particular Israel’s place within it. Israel is no longer totally isolated, but nor is it fully integrated. Moreover, the Arab-Israeli conflict is no longer the only conflict in the Middle East. There is an increasing number of disputes between Arab states over the limited natural resources in the region.

Key Questions
1. How have security systems in the Middle East changed between 1994 and 2000?
2. Consider the increasing importance of the water issue in the Middle East
3. What is the economic and military significance of Israel’s new alliance with Turkey from 1994 to 2000?

Security Issues in the Middle East

Recommended reading

Background reading
Water Issues in the Middle East

Recommended reading

Background reading

Israeli-Turkish Relations

Recommended reading
Background reading

Conclusions

Several general issues emerge from the processes outlined in this subject introduction. They include the following:

1. The role of domestic Arab and Israeli politics in shaping the conflict needs to be considered from 1948 onwards. In the Arab world this was compounded by the instability of many Arab regimes, and the use of the Arab-Israeli conflict by leaders to deflect attention from increasing domestic difficulties, particularly economic ones. In Israel, the importance of coalition forming and maintenance has restricted the room for manoeuvre on the peace process of several Israeli leaders. This was particularly apparent during the political instability of the 1990’s, when Israel had five different prime ministers.

2. The role of the external actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been central to both the wars and the efforts to reach peace agreements. It is important to consider the dynamic role of the United States from 1967 onwards, and particularly its attempt to bring peace to the area.

Key Questions

1. What have been the domestic restraints on foreign policy formation in Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria?
2. Consider the changing role of the United States in the Arab-Israeli conflict.